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ABSTRACT
Recent years have seen a trend towards decentralisation -
from initiatives on decentralized web to decentralized network
infrastructures (e.g community networks). In this position
paper, we present an architectural vision for decentralising
cloud service infrastructures. Our vision is on the notion of
community cloud infrastructures on top of decentralised ac-
cess infrastructures i.e. community networks, using resources
pooled from the community. Our architectural vision takes
into consideration some of the fundamental challenges of inte-
grating the current state of the art virtualisation technologies
such as Software Defined Networking (SDN) into community
infrastructures which are highly unreliable. Our proposed
design goal is to include lightweight virtualization and fault
tolerance mechanisms into the architecture to ensure suffi-
cient level of reliability to support critical applications.
Keywords
decentralised community clouds; resilient clouds; lightweight
virtualization
1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet, which started off as a decentralised network,
has over the years become increasingly centralised with a
staggering percentage of communications flowing through
access and service infrastructures controlled by a set of cor-
porations who are (naturally) economically motivated. Such
centralisation of infrastructures mean, for the other three
billion (who are yet to go online) to get connected and re-
alise the benefits of the Internet, they are dependent on
existing big players. Decentralisation is hence a form of
empowerment, allowing fairer participation, where smaller
players (e.g. local stakeholders) can make things happen
on their own. To expedite the process of connecting the
remaining three billion, we need to enable and support de-
centralised bottom up initiatives (such as community owned
infrastructures and services) that are complimentary to ex-
isting centralised services. Recent years have witnessed this
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Figure 1: Guifi.net nodes and links
growing trend of decentralisation of infrastructures through
the rise of the Community Networks (CNs). The reluctance
of network operators to provide wired and cellular infrastruc-
tures to rural/remote areas as well as the need for affordable
connectivity in urban areas have led to several bottom up
community led initiatives to build large-scale, self-organized,
decentralized CNs. In such CNs, communities pool their
resources to build and govern their own access and service
infrastructures. There are several examples of successful
CNs, most notably Guifi.net [1]. Guifi.net which started off
in Barcelona in 2004 has currently a total of 33, 800 nodes,
accounting for 52, 354 WiFi links making a total length of
58, 612 km. Figure 1 shows as example the nodes and links
of Guifi.net in the city of Barcelona.
With many examples around the world, CNs grow organ-
ically without any strict planning and hence face several
technology challenges. They are heterogeneous in nature
with a high level of node and network diversity (including dif-
ferent topologies), raising problems associated with resource
management, instability and unavailability.
Infrastructure: The infrastructure in the CN such as
Guifi.net is highly unreliable and heterogeneous [2]. Devices
and the network are very heterogeneous compared to the Data
Centers (DCs) where they are very homogeneous. The strong
heterogeneity is due to the diverse capacity of nodes and links,
as well as the asymmetric quality of wireless links. Employed
technologies in the CNs vary significantly, ranging from very
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Figure 2: Node availability
low-cost, off-the-shelf wireless (WiFi) routers, home gateways,
laptops to different type of antennas (e.g., parabolic) and op-
tical fibre equipment. These devices forming the community
clouds are co-located in either users homes or within other
infrastructures distributed in the CNs. The unreliability of
current CN devices and the network limits their usability in
critical applications that demand predictable performance
or can assure Quality of Service (QoS). For instance we can
examine the availability of the Guifi.net nodes in Barcelona
as shown in Figure 2. We have conducted experiments to
measure reachability, represented in Figure 2 in a ECDF
plot of the availability of the nodes. We assume that a node
is available if it is reachable. We can see that 40% of the
base-graph nodes (i.e., client nodes) are reachable from the
network 90% or less of the time. The situation seems to
be better with the core-graph nodes, which are the most
stable part of the network (i.e., 20% of the core-graph nodes
have an availability of 90% or less). Core-graph nodes have
higher availability because they comprise the backbone of
the network and connect different administrative zones. The
successful operation of the base-graph nodes depends on the
core-graph nodes.
Topology: The network topology in a wireless CN such
as Guifi.net is organic and different with respect to conven-
tional ISP (Internet Service Provider) networks. Guifi.net is
composed of numerous distributed CNs and they represent
different types of network topologies. The overall topology
is constantly changing and there is no fixed topology as in
the DC environment. The Guifi.net network shows some
typical patterns from the urban networks (i.e., meshed net-
works) combined with an unusual deployment, that do not
completely fit neither with organically grown networks nor
with planned networks [3]. This implies that a solution (i.e.,
algorithm) that works in a certain topology might not work
in another one.
Services: In the Guifi.net CN, Internet cloud services
have equivalent local alternatives that are owned and oper-
ated at the community level. There are two type of services
in the network: network-focused and user-focused services.
Figure 3 depicts the evolution in the number of instances of
user and network-focused services during the last 10 years.
Considering that network management is of interest to all
users in the network (i.e., to keep the network up and run-
ning), Figure 3 reveals that service instances related to the
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Figure 3: Number of user and network services
network operation outnumber the local services intended for
end-users. Moreover, one of the most frequent of all the
services, whether user-focused or network-focused, are the
proxy services [4]. Proxies act as free shared gateways to the
Internet for the CN users. Specifically for the user-focused
services, the percentage of Internet access services (i.e., prox-
ies and tunnel-based) is higher than 55%, confirming that
the users of Guifi.net are typically interested in accessing
the Internet [5]. Further, other important services are web
hosting, data storage, VoIP, and video streaming.
Operating in this large and constantly changing environ-
ment requires the deployment of resilient service infrastruc-
tures that can efficiently react to diverse changes. Enabling
resilient service infrastructures are crucial to the economic
sustainability of CNs as it creates new economic opportunities
for the community e.g. incentivising local service providers
to utilise, contribute and maintain the CN infrastructure to
provide new services.
These results suggest that, with its current reliability
Guifi.net can hardly be used to support critical applications
in terms of strict performance or availability guarantees. This
is the case for critical local sensing and control services, such
as smart power grids that take use two-way communication
to integrate supply to end-device consumption to implement
dynamic energy prices and on-demand generation. Other ex-
amples are IoT applications used in smart cities like for road
traffic management, such as street-line parking that relies on
two way communication between sensors and car-drivers.
Though both publicly available commercial clouds (e.g.
Amazon AWS or Windows Azure) and community clouds
(e.g. inside Guifi.net) are based on the fundamental idea
of resource sharing through virtualisation techniques, they
differ in several aspects. For instance, public cloud services
are owned and managed by a central authority and have
highly reliable infrastructure. Conversely, community clouds
lack central ownership and management and are deployed
at the edge of the Internet, normally close to the users.
These particularities of local community clouds make them
attractive to several applications for example, they are free
from vendor lock-in, lower exposure of personal data to third
parties, no reliance on good Internet connectivity, and lower
latency.
The task of building resilient local community clouds on
the basis of unreliable CNs is challenging. In this position
paper, we layout our architectural vision where we argue that
the problem of resilience can be solved with the assistance of
Software Defined Network (SDN), Network Function Virtual-
isation (NFV) and lightweight OS virtualisation technologies
in combination with monitoring techniques. The idea is to
use such technologies to build fault tolerance mechanisms
based on replication, redundancy, relocation, decentralisa-
tion and dynamic reconfiguration performed on the basis of
monitored metrics. In the subsequent sections, we explain
the general ideas and discuss some preliminary work that we
have conducted in this direction.
2. COMMUNITY CLOUDS
CN clouds (i.e., micro-clouds) are built on top of the CNs.
In this model, a cloud is deployed closer to CN users and
other existing infrastructure. The community cloud model is
different from Fog computing, which extends cloud computing
by introducing an intermediate layer between devices and
data centers. Community clouds take the opposite track,
by putting services closer to consumers, so that no further
or minimal action takes place in the Internet. In that way,
fragile Internet connectivity is no longer a key issue, and
personal data and therefore privacy can be better preserved.
They are deployed over a single or set of user nodes, and
comparing to the public clouds they have a smaller scale, so
one still gets high performance due to locality and control
over service placement [6]. The infrastructure of Community
Clouds consists of mesh routers, mesh clients and optionally
gateways (i.e., proxies) typically deployed on every home.
The routers (i.e., outdoor routers) communicate with each
other via radio transmissions and employ special-purpose
routing protocols as BMX6[7]. Mesh clients access the net-
work via one of the routers, while gateways provide connectiv-
ity to the Internet. Client nodes consists of home gateways,
laptops or desktop PCs.
Cloudy: In order to foster the adoption and transition
of the community cloud environment, we have developed
Cloudy [8], a community cloud software distribution, which
contains the infrastructure, platform and application services
of the community cloud system. Cloudy is the core software
of our community clouds, because it unifies the different tools
and services of the cloud system in a Debian-based Linux
distribution. Cloudy is open-source and can be downloaded
from public repositories1. Cloudy’s main components can
be considered a layered stack, with services residing both
inside the kernel and at the user level. Services are running
on Docker and LXC containers.
3. ARCHITECTURE
A resilient community cloud infrastructure should allow the
contribution of networking, computing, and storage resources,
and the allocation of a fraction of these resources (a slice) to
services composed by a set of application service-elements
consuming these resources. A resource slice (see Figure 4)
is an integrated collection of resources with its own virtualised
network, network controller, network functions, integrated
with its set of application service-elements. The resource
slice is exposed to external users’ load and a set of varying
environmental issues such as asymmetric or unidirectional
paths, network partitions, component failures and congestion;
that require a reactive and adaptive behaviour.
1https://github.com/Clommunity/
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Figure 4: Architecture of a slice
To enable efficient resource pooling of infrastructures both
devices and networks, we will exploit the recent advances
in lightweight OS virtualisation, NFV and SDN to build a
resilient decentralised cloud infrastructure.
Advances in NFV allow services, computation or functions
to be orchestrated or placed and executed in any part of a
network, thus removing the need for (costly) custom built
hardware boxes. The advances in NFV coupled with the
advances in lightweight OS virtualisation technologies such
as Docker or Unikernels [9], services can be made entirely
mobile and be potentially migrated between two nodes in
a network at a very low cost. Considering that communi-
ties pool their (rather limited) resources, enabling flexible
orchestration of services [10] i.e by allowing services to be
instantiated when and where needed as well as supporting
(live) migration between nodes at a lower cost, is indeed a
boon for decentralised community clouds.
Once services have been initiated, SDN [11] can be used for:
a) Service chaining network functions by configuring routes
in switches based on policies. b) Modifying packet headers
appropriately to support such service chaining. c) Implement-
ing load balancing algorithms avoiding the need for service
providers/operators to manually install traffic splitting rules
or use custom load balancing solutions.
CNs introduce specific challenges in terms of trust, reliabil-
ity and cooperation inducing issues such as asymmetric paths,
unidirectional paths, network partitions etc. that make im-
plementing SDN extremely challenging. The challenge we
face is to build a resilient communication infrastructure out
of unreliable components. The problem can be addressed
either with support for asynchronous control in SDN [12]
(preload of rules in proxy controllers), or with the help of
fault forecasting techniques complemented with fault tolerant
techniques. That allows to handle gracefully situations that
are difficult or too costly to anticipate and prevent [13] in
an ideal environment.
The goal of our architecture is to design a reliable service
on the basis of these unreliable components taking advan-
tage of their inherent high decentralisation, cutting edge
technology provided by SDNs, fault tolerant techniques and
sophisticated cloud management algorithms. To address the
problem we will take advantage of the logical centralization
management offered by SDNs and of their flexibility in the
virtualisation and dynamic relocation of network functions.
We will also take advantage of the high level of connectivity
(mesh topology) normally exhibited by community networks.
The challenge is to develop techniques and algorithms that
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Figure 5: Architecture of a resilient local community
cloud
allows cloud service providers use SDN controllers to reconfig-
ure their communication network dynamically in response to
detected outages, ideally, through anticipation or pre-loading.
Our architecture integrates the resources offered by com-
munity networks with SDN components in a manner that
third parties can use resource slices and offer them as cloud
services to other parties to deploy their application services,
under agreed upon QoS guarantees. Our proposed architec-
ture can provide safety guarantees that the functionality of
the applications service running on top is never compromised
despite failures of individual components (for example, links)
of the underlying infrastructure. Likewise, it can provide
liveness properties that ensure that the underlying infras-
tructure will eventually recover and continue to deliver its
service (for example, after a bounded reconfiguration time)
despite a bounded number of network related failures.
3.1 Architectural components
Figure 5 depicts a preliminary view of the architecture we
propose. Note that this is only a conceptual view to illustrate
our ideas. Figure 5 shows two independent substrate net-
works NS1 and NS2 (in principle, there might be more). We
assume that they are unreliable community networks. R1, R2,
etc., are switches, whereas C1, C2, etc., are controllers used
for manipulating the switches. CB1 and CB1 are community
boxes (running Cloudy) with computation resources capable
of hosting virtual machines. Though not shown in the figure,
community boxes include communication, computation and
storage resources and are normally used by users to gain
access to the community network. Note that in pursuit of
reliability, some controllers might be replicated, like C2 and
C3 in relation to R5. In addition to communication, the
substrate networks independently offer computation (CB1
and CB2) and storage (disk1 and disk2) to Cloud Service
Managers (CSMs) (only one of them in shown) by means
of resource virtualisation. The CSM is in full control of the
virtualised resources and offers local cloud services to end
users with QoS guarantees in spite of the unreliability exhib-
ited by the substrate networks. The CSM is responsible for
monitoring the pooled computational and storage resources
and reacting to eventualities by means of reconfiguration.
The CSM has a set of functions that enable the orchestration
of resources. In Figure 5, these functions are aggregated as
application service deployment, slice reconfiguration and net-
work monitoring functions. These functions help the Cloud
Service Manager to deal with additional complexity that
fault-tolerance mechanisms inevitably introduce.
As depicted in Fig. 5, an end user requests (deployment
request) the deployment of an application service (End-user’s
application service) - the resources and the QoS needed are
specified in a deployment descriptorThe request might be
accepted or rejected by the CSM. If the request is accepted,
the CSM via the application service deployment function
instantiates a resource slice that is required to satisfy the
requirement of the application. In the example, the applica-
tion service deployment instantiates three virtual machines
(VMA, VMB , and VMC) to service the deployment requests,
a virtual monitor (vmonitor) to collect metrics about the per-
formance of the slice and three controllers (CA, CB , and CC)
to reconfigure the slice as needed to make the slice resilient
to internal and external events. Note the slice is instantiated
upon request and mapped to the resources available from the
underlying substrate. For example, in the snapshot shown,
CA can be an instance of C1 provided by NS1, whereas CC
can be an instance of C3. Likewise, VMA and VMB can be
instances created in CB1, and so on. Since the slice can be
dynamically reconfigured, the cloud service manager might
migrate VMB to CB2 upon detecting that CB1 is becoming
overloaded. Alternatively, to reduce energy and monetary
costs, the CSM might release one of the virtual machines
upon detecting that it is under-utilised. Sophisticated al-
gorithms are needed to reconfigure the network topology.
Imagine that packets from RA to RD travel through RB and
that the path is exhibiting congestion problems. To avoid
further complications, the CSM might decide to route pack-
ets through RC and leave RB out of the routing activities,
including terminating the RB instance. The challenge of this
reconfiguration is that it requires a coordinated effort of the
three controllers (RA, RB and RC). For instance, RB and
RC need to agree on the alterations of the routing tables of
RC that they share. In addition, they need to coordinate
with CA so that RC is activated before RB is terminated.
Typical examples of external events are requests placed by
clients against the running service application. Though not
explicitly shown in the figure, typical internal events likely
to impact the slice are failures of the virtual appliances and
in particular failures and congestion of the communication
links. To minimise the risk of link failures that might result
in network partition that leave controllers unreachable, the
CSM deploys replications of its controllers - the core elements
of its slice. For instance, note that RC can be configured
either by CB or CC . The responsibility of the cloud service
is to reconfigure the slice with the assistance of the slice
reconfiguration to make it resilient.
3.2 Resilience
The resilience of a resource slice supporting a service relies
on the use of SDN and NFV techniques to implement re-
dundancy, decentralization and reconfiguration. To achieve
resilience, we need to provide fault-tolerance mechanism at
both the data plane (switches and links) and control plane
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Figure 6: Controller software layers.
(controllers, controller to switches links and controller to
controller links). In this discussion we focus on the control
plane, that is, on the most sensitive part of the architecture
as it serves as the foundation to make the data plane fault
tolerant.
Notice that the three SDN controllers (CA, CB and CC)
used by the CSM for reconfiguring the slices are geographi-
cally distributed. The reconfiguration of network functions is
very likely to involve live migration of services and network
functions implemented as virtual machines (VMA and VMB
in the figure). Likewise, the reconfiguration of the communi-
cation infrastructure is very likely to involve alteration of the
communication topology. In general, the execution of a recon-
figuration script (for example, to update the routing tables
of the switches R1, R2, etc.) will trigger the execution of un-
derneath distributed algorithms among the SDN controllers.
These distributed algorithms (protocols) will ensure that the
state of the slice remains consistent after each reconfigura-
tion. The execution of these algorithms need to account for
all the issues that impact asynchronous distributed systems
such as the impossibility of reaching consensus in distributed
systems with nodes that are vulnerable to crashes; and the
impossibility of guaranteeing consistency, availability and
partition tolerance (CAP theorem) [14].
We anticipate different situations that will demand the
execution of different reconfiguration scripts. To implement
those scripts we follow a systematic approach based on the
layered architecture shown in Figure 6 and inspired by [15].
A given layer offers a set of abstractions (presented as an
API) to the layer immediately above as suggested in [16].
L, VM , and RT stand for Level, Virtual Machine and Real
Time, respectively. Notice that L1, L2 and L3 include generic
distributed algorithms that abstracted away from the CSM
but executed underneath by the reconfiguration scripts.
We assume that controller-to–controller communication is
performed over an unreliable network that corresponds to
the unreliable communication links of the network substrates
(NS1 and NS2) of Figure 5. L1 includes algorithms for fail-
ure detection and permanent storage backup. L2 includes
algorithms for achieving consensus with different degrees of
accuracy such as Paxos, real time consensus, uniform consen-
sus, probabilistic consensus and approximate consensus [17].
L4 which correspond to the reconfiguration executable scripts
mentioned mentioned earlier.
The modularity followed in Figure 6 is intended to en-
courage re-usability (of L1, L2 and L3 in particular) and to
facilitate plugging in of different algorithms to match the re-
quirements of the problem at hand. Let us take consensus as
an example. As explained in [17], consensus algorithms with
different degrees of accuracy are the basis for implementing
other distributed algorithms. Strong consistency may be
overkill for some applications, whereas in other applications
eventual consistency may not be enough. Regarding Figure 5,
a strong consensus algorithm will be executed between the
controllers before altering the routing tables of RA, RB , RC
and RD that define the network topology and to elect a
new leader among the controllers, however, an approximate
consensus result would be enough to decide the outcome of
a set of replicated monitors. Ideally, each level from L1 to
L3 should provide libraries of equivalent generic algorithms
for the benefit of the designer.
4. ONGOING WORK AND RESEARCH
CHALLENGES
Network resilience has been the subject of research interest
for decades. The effort has produced several ideas for imple-
menting fault–tolerance mechanisms, which are mainly based
on replication, design diversity and distribution of the critical
software and hardware components. These mechanisms were
devised before virtualisation technology (VMs, containers,
unikernels, etc.) became common practice. Virtualisation
opens new opportunities in network resilience but, at the
same time, demands a revision of the traditional mechanisms
to be assured that they cope and, if possible, take advantage
of the new abstractions that virtualisation supports such as
live-migration of components and seamlessly replication by
means of lightweight VMs. These are open research questions.
For example, it is not clear to us how conventional failure
detectors will cope with dynamic instantiation, relocation
and life-migration of components.
The use of SDN technology in the provision of network re-
silience raises several research questions about the implemen-
tation of the SDN control plane. The notion of the “logically
centralised controller” that is used to operate the switches is
a useful abstraction but hard to implement in practice, in
particular in large networks with hundreds of thousands of
switches and tens of thousands of controllers [18]. The chal-
lenge is in the implementation of a distributed and scalable
SDN control plane. This challenge includes the development
of consensus algorithms with different degrees of accuracy
that can run over different controller topologies (peer-to–peer,
hierarchical, etc.) built on unreliable communication links.
We are currently working in this direction.
A close examination of the architecture of Figure 5 will
reveal that we are dealing with a typical reactive system
where a control entity is used to control the behaviour of an
external entity that sends notifications to the controller about
events of interest [19]. In our scenario, the control entity, the
external entity and the notifications correspond respectively
to the three controllers, the slice and the vmonitor. Reactive
systems are notoriously hard to describe formally, reason
about for correctness and implement, in particular, when
they are required to respond in real time and even harder,
when the response is the result of a coordinated effort of
the components. The challenge here is to define notations
to describe SDN topologies, that can help reason about the
SDN control plane, for instance, that can help visualise the
global state kept in the logically centralised controller and
the partial states kept in the individual controllers.
Fault-tolerance mechanisms inevitably result in additional
complexity. To avoid an explosion of complexity, we are
studying the principles of structuring for fault tolerance, de-
veloped by the dependability of community [20]. Intuitively,
the idea is to use fault tolerance techniques systematically to
ensure error containment which aims at limiting the impact
of faults. In our specific scenario, error containment will
ensure that failures of links or controllers do not propagate
wildly and collapse the whole network. We will take a rigor-
ous approach to quantify and compare the effectiveness of
our reconfiguration actions. To give an example, to assess
the resilience of a topology at the link level, we will use the
concept of robustness coefficient. We will take advantage of
some preliminary work that we have conducted on the Guifi
network [2]. Structuring for fault tolerance is based on the
explicit separation of concerns between normal and abnor-
mal behaviour. It requires the incorporation of mechanisms
for enforcing fault models (for example, silent or byzantine
crashes) and detecting errors (for example, by timeouts), as
well as propagating and handling them in a structured way.
These software techniques to confine errors can be supported
by the architecture in the deployment of controllers. As
suggested in [18], a hierarchical deployment (as opposed to
peer to peer) might help to confine errors propagated by
compromised or buggy controllers.
5. CONCLUSIONS
CNs provide an excellent scenario to deploy and use com-
munity services in a contributory or crowdsourced manner.
Local CNs provide Internet access in neglected regions, but
that potential is narrowed by their inherent unreliability. As
they are, local CN may not reliable enough to support cloud
services for business or community critical applications. We
argue that reliability can be provided by means of augmenting
the local community cloud with fault–tolerance mechanisms
based on the combination of monitoring and virtualisation
technologies. However, the solution is not straight forward
as it raises several research questions and requires the de-
velopment of several supporting tool for the Cloud Service
Manager. We raise some fundamental research questions in
the hope of triggering discussions and motivating research in
this direction.
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